e8c1f5c8d3
Merge in DNS/adguard-home from 2508-ip-conversion to master Updates #2508. Squashed commit of the following: commit 3f64709fbc73ef74c11b910997be1e9bc337193c Merge: 5ac7faaaa0d67aa251
Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Jan 13 16:21:34 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 2508-ip-conversion commit 5ac7faaaa9dda570fdb872acad5d13d078f46b64 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Jan 13 12:00:11 2021 +0300 all: replace conditions with appropriate functions in tests commit 9e3fa9a115ed23024c57dd5192d5173477ddbf71 Merge: db992a42abba74859e
Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Wed Jan 13 10:47:10 2021 +0300 Merge branch 'master' into 2508-ip-conversion commit db992a42a2c6f315421e78a6a0492e2bfb3ce89d Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 12 18:55:53 2021 +0300 sysutil: fix linux tests commit f629b15d62349323ce2da05e68dc9cc0b5f6e194 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 12 18:41:20 2021 +0300 all: improve code quality commit 3bf03a75524040738562298bd1de6db536af130f Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 12 17:33:26 2021 +0300 sysutil: fix linux net.IP conversion commit 5d5b6994916923636e635588631b63b7e7b74e5f Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Tue Jan 12 14:57:26 2021 +0300 dnsforward: remove redundant net.IP <-> string conversion commit 0b955d99b7fad40942f21d1dd8734adb99126195 Author: Eugene Burkov <e.burkov@adguard.com> Date: Mon Jan 11 18:04:25 2021 +0300 dhcpd: remove net.IP <-> string conversion
416 lines
10 KiB
Go
416 lines
10 KiB
Go
package dnsforward
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import (
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"net"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dhcpd"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/dnsfilter"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/AdGuardHome/internal/util"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/dnsproxy/proxy"
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"github.com/AdguardTeam/golibs/log"
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"github.com/miekg/dns"
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)
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// To transfer information between modules
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type dnsContext struct {
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srv *Server
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proxyCtx *proxy.DNSContext
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setts *dnsfilter.RequestFilteringSettings // filtering settings for this client
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startTime time.Time
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result *dnsfilter.Result
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origResp *dns.Msg // response received from upstream servers. Set when response is modified by filtering
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origQuestion dns.Question // question received from client. Set when Rewrites are used.
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err error // error returned from the module
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protectionEnabled bool // filtering is enabled, dnsfilter object is ready
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responseFromUpstream bool // response is received from upstream servers
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origReqDNSSEC bool // DNSSEC flag in the original request from user
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}
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const (
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resultDone = iota // module has completed its job, continue
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resultFinish // module has completed its job, exit normally
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resultError // an error occurred, exit with an error
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)
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// handleDNSRequest filters the incoming DNS requests and writes them to the query log
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func (s *Server) handleDNSRequest(_ *proxy.Proxy, d *proxy.DNSContext) error {
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ctx := &dnsContext{srv: s, proxyCtx: d}
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ctx.result = &dnsfilter.Result{}
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ctx.startTime = time.Now()
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type modProcessFunc func(ctx *dnsContext) int
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// Since (*dnsforward.Server).handleDNSRequest(...) is used as
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// proxy.(Config).RequestHandler, there is no need for additional index
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// out of range checking in any of the following functions, because the
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// (*proxy.Proxy).handleDNSRequest method performs it before calling the
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// appropriate handler.
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mods := []modProcessFunc{
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processInitial,
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processInternalHosts,
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processInternalIPAddrs,
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processFilteringBeforeRequest,
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processUpstream,
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processDNSSECAfterResponse,
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processFilteringAfterResponse,
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s.ipset.process,
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processQueryLogsAndStats,
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}
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for _, process := range mods {
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r := process(ctx)
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switch r {
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case resultDone:
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// continue: call the next filter
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case resultFinish:
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return nil
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case resultError:
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return ctx.err
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}
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}
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if d.Res != nil {
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d.Res.Compress = true // some devices require DNS message compression
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}
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return nil
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}
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// Perform initial checks; process WHOIS & rDNS
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func processInitial(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if s.conf.AAAADisabled && d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA {
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_ = proxy.CheckDisabledAAAARequest(d, true)
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return resultFinish
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}
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if s.conf.OnDNSRequest != nil {
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s.conf.OnDNSRequest(d)
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}
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// disable Mozilla DoH
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// https://support.mozilla.org/en-US/kb/canary-domain-use-application-dnsnet
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if (d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || d.Req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) &&
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d.Req.Question[0].Name == "use-application-dns.net." {
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d.Res = s.genNXDomain(d.Req)
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return resultFinish
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}
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return resultDone
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}
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// Return TRUE if host names doesn't contain disallowed characters
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func isHostnameOK(hostname string) bool {
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for _, c := range hostname {
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if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') ||
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(c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') ||
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(c >= '0' && c <= '9') ||
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c == '.' || c == '-') {
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log.Debug("DNS: skipping invalid hostname %s from DHCP", hostname)
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return false
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}
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}
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return true
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}
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func (s *Server) onDHCPLeaseChanged(flags int) {
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switch flags {
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case dhcpd.LeaseChangedAdded,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedAddedStatic,
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dhcpd.LeaseChangedRemovedStatic:
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//
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default:
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return
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}
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hostToIP := make(map[string]net.IP)
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m := make(map[string]string)
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ll := s.dhcpServer.Leases(dhcpd.LeasesAll)
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for _, l := range ll {
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if len(l.Hostname) == 0 || !isHostnameOK(l.Hostname) {
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continue
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}
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lowhost := strings.ToLower(l.Hostname)
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m[l.IP.String()] = lowhost
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ip := make(net.IP, 4)
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copy(ip, l.IP.To4())
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hostToIP[lowhost] = ip
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: added %d A/PTR entries from DHCP", len(m))
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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s.tableHostToIP = hostToIP
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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s.tablePTR = m
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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}
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// Respond to A requests if the target host name is associated with a lease from our DHCP server
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func processInternalHosts(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
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if !(req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA || req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeAAAA) {
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return resultDone
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}
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host := req.Question[0].Name
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host = strings.ToLower(host)
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if !strings.HasSuffix(host, ".lan.") {
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return resultDone
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}
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host = strings.TrimSuffix(host, ".lan.")
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Lock()
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if s.tableHostToIP == nil {
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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return resultDone
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}
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ip, ok := s.tableHostToIP[host]
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s.tableHostToIPLock.Unlock()
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if !ok {
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return resultDone
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: internal record: %s -> %s", req.Question[0].Name, ip)
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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if req.Question[0].Qtype == dns.TypeA {
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a := &dns.A{}
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a.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
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Name: req.Question[0].Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypeA,
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Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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}
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a.A = make([]byte, 4)
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copy(a.A, ip)
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, a)
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}
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ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultDone
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}
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// Respond to PTR requests if the target IP address is leased by our DHCP server
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func processInternalIPAddrs(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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req := ctx.proxyCtx.Req
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if req.Question[0].Qtype != dns.TypePTR {
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return resultDone
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}
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arpa := req.Question[0].Name
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arpa = strings.TrimSuffix(arpa, ".")
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arpa = strings.ToLower(arpa)
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ip := util.DNSUnreverseAddr(arpa)
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if ip == nil {
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return resultDone
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}
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s.tablePTRLock.Lock()
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if s.tablePTR == nil {
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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return resultDone
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}
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host, ok := s.tablePTR[ip.String()]
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s.tablePTRLock.Unlock()
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if !ok {
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return resultDone
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}
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log.Debug("DNS: reverse-lookup: %s -> %s", arpa, host)
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resp := s.makeResponse(req)
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ptr := &dns.PTR{}
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ptr.Hdr = dns.RR_Header{
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Name: req.Question[0].Name,
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Rrtype: dns.TypePTR,
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Ttl: s.conf.BlockedResponseTTL,
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Class: dns.ClassINET,
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}
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ptr.Ptr = host + "."
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resp.Answer = append(resp.Answer, ptr)
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ctx.proxyCtx.Res = resp
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return resultDone
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}
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// Apply filtering logic
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func processFilteringBeforeRequest(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultDone // response is already set - nothing to do
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}
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s.RLock()
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// Synchronize access to s.dnsFilter so it won't be suddenly uninitialized while in use.
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// This could happen after proxy server has been stopped, but its workers are not yet exited.
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//
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// A better approach is for proxy.Stop() to wait until all its workers exit,
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// but this would require the Upstream interface to have Close() function
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// (to prevent from hanging while waiting for unresponsive DNS server to respond).
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var err error
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ctx.protectionEnabled = s.conf.ProtectionEnabled && s.dnsFilter != nil
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if ctx.protectionEnabled {
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ctx.setts = s.getClientRequestFilteringSettings(d)
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ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSRequest(ctx)
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}
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s.RUnlock()
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = err
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return resultError
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}
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return resultDone
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}
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// processUpstream passes request to upstream servers and handles the response.
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func processUpstream(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if d.Res != nil {
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return resultDone // response is already set - nothing to do
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}
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if d.Addr != nil && s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient != nil {
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clientIP := IPStringFromAddr(d.Addr)
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upstreamsConf := s.conf.GetCustomUpstreamByClient(clientIP)
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if upstreamsConf != nil {
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log.Debug("Using custom upstreams for %s", clientIP)
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d.CustomUpstreamConfig = upstreamsConf
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}
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}
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if s.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
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opt := d.Req.IsEdns0()
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if opt == nil {
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log.Debug("DNS: Adding OPT record with DNSSEC flag")
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d.Req.SetEdns0(4096, true)
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} else if !opt.Do() {
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opt.SetDo(true)
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} else {
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ctx.origReqDNSSEC = true
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}
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}
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// request was not filtered so let it be processed further
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err := s.dnsProxy.Resolve(d)
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = err
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return resultError
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}
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ctx.responseFromUpstream = true
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return resultDone
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}
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// Process DNSSEC after response from upstream server
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func processDNSSECAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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if !ctx.responseFromUpstream || // don't process response if it's not from upstream servers
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!ctx.srv.conf.EnableDNSSEC {
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return resultDone
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}
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if !ctx.origReqDNSSEC {
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optResp := d.Res.IsEdns0()
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if optResp != nil && !optResp.Do() {
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return resultDone
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}
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// Remove RRSIG records from response
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// because there is no DO flag in the original request from client,
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// but we have EnableDNSSEC set, so we have set DO flag ourselves,
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// and now we have to clean up the DNS records our client didn't ask for.
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answers := []dns.RR{}
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for _, a := range d.Res.Answer {
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switch a.(type) {
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case *dns.RRSIG:
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log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
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default:
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answers = append(answers, a)
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}
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}
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d.Res.Answer = answers
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answers = []dns.RR{}
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for _, a := range d.Res.Ns {
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switch a.(type) {
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case *dns.RRSIG:
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log.Debug("Removing RRSIG record from response: %v", a)
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default:
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answers = append(answers, a)
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}
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}
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d.Res.Ns = answers
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}
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return resultDone
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}
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// Apply filtering logic after we have received response from upstream servers
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func processFilteringAfterResponse(ctx *dnsContext) int {
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s := ctx.srv
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d := ctx.proxyCtx
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res := ctx.result
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var err error
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switch res.Reason {
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case dnsfilter.Rewritten,
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dnsfilter.RewrittenRule:
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if len(ctx.origQuestion.Name) == 0 {
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// origQuestion is set in case we get only CNAME without IP from rewrites table
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break
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}
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d.Req.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
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d.Res.Question[0] = ctx.origQuestion
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if len(d.Res.Answer) != 0 {
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answer := []dns.RR{}
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answer = append(answer, s.genAnswerCNAME(d.Req, res.CanonName))
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answer = append(answer, d.Res.Answer...)
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d.Res.Answer = answer
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}
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case dnsfilter.NotFilteredAllowList:
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// nothing
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default:
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if !ctx.protectionEnabled || // filters are disabled: there's nothing to check for
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!ctx.responseFromUpstream { // only check response if it's from an upstream server
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break
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}
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origResp2 := d.Res
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ctx.result, err = s.filterDNSResponse(ctx)
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if err != nil {
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ctx.err = err
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return resultError
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}
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if ctx.result != nil {
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ctx.origResp = origResp2 // matched by response
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} else {
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ctx.result = &dnsfilter.Result{}
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}
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}
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return resultDone
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}
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